Abstract-Quantifying the notion of fairness is underexplored when there are multiple types of resources and users request different ratios of the different resources. A typical example is data centers processing jobs with heterogeneous resource requirements on CPU, memory, network bandwidth, etc. In such cases, a tradeoff arises between equitability, or "fairness," and efficiency. This paper develops a unifying framework addressing the fairness-efficiency tradeoff in light of multiple types of resources. We develop two families of fairness functions that provide different tradeoffs, characterize the effect of user requests' heterogeneity, and prove conditions under which these fairness measures satisfy the Pareto efficiency, sharing incentive, and envy-free properties. Intuitions behind the analysis are explained in two visualizations of multiresource allocation. We also investigate people's fairness perceptions through an online survey of allocation preferences.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Motivation

C
OMPARING the fairness of different allocations of a single type of resource has been extensively studied. Fairness can be quantified with a variety of metrics, such as Jain's index [1] . Other notions of fairness, including proportional and max-min fairness, are achieved through maximization of -fair or isoelastic utility functions [2] . These approaches, as well as others from economics and sociology, have recently been unified as the unique family of functions satisfying four axioms for fairness metrics [3] - [5] . The tradeoff between fairness and efficiency has also been studied in [6] - [8] .
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNET.2012.2233213 Fig. 1 . Example of multiresource requirements in data centers.
paper [9] being a notable exception. Indeed, it is unclear what it means to say that a multiresource allocation is "fair." Each user in a network requires a certain combination of different resource types to process one job, and this combination may differ from user to user. For example, data centers allocate different resources (memory, CPUs, storage, bandwidth, etc.) to competing users with different requirements. One user might have computational jobs requiring more CPU cycles than memory, while another might have the opposite requirements. The need for multiresource fairness functions can be illustrated with a very simple example, as shown in Fig. 1 . In this example, two users require CPUs and memory in order to perform some jobs. User 1 requires 2 GB of memory and three CPUs per job, while user 2 needs 2 GB of memory and one CPU per job. There are a total of 6 GB of memory and four CPUs.
Many allocations might be considered "fair" in this example: Should users be allocated resources in proportion to their resource requirements? Or should they be allocated resources so as to process equal numbers of jobs? The fairness measure proposed recently in [9] , called Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), allocates resources according to max-min fairness on dominant resource shares. In this example, DRF would allocate 0.76 jobs to user 1 and 1.71 jobs to user 2, for a total of 2.47 jobs processed. However, this allocation brings about a significant loss in system efficiency; e.g., a more unequal allocation of 0 jobs to user 1 and 3 jobs to user 2 yields a total of 3 jobs. An in-between allocation can be realized if another well-known fairness metric, -fairness, is adapted for multiple resources following our methods in Section III-B. For , user 1 has 0.57 jobs and user 2 has 2.29 jobs, for a total of 2.86 jobs. Each of these allocations represents one point of the fairness-efficiency tradeoff. This paper develops a unifying framework for studying this tradeoff in light of multiple types of resources and heterogeneity in users' resource requirements.
Multiresource allocation problems arise in increasingly many applications. Data centers that sell bundles of CPUs, memory, storage, and network bandwidth are just one example. In fact, even the classical problem of bandwidth allocation in a congested network can be viewed as a special case of multiresource allocation. Given a network and its topology, we can view each link as a separate resource with a distinct capacity. Each user is represented by a network flow, which uses a predefined subset of links. In this special case, the user requests the same amount of bandwidth on each link.
In general, multiresource allocation cannot be turned into single-resource allocation by interchanging different resources. For example, if a cloud client needs both CPU and network bandwidth for each job, adding more CPU does not reduce the amount of required bandwidth. Tenants may also submit workflows requiring a fixed ratio of resources. Even similar resources such as bandwidth on different links are nonsubstitutable, as users require bandwidth on each utilized link (see the technical report [3, Appendix C] for an example).
We use "fairness function" in the tradition of existing literature to refer to the mathematical notion encompassing both "fairness" (i.e., equitability) and "efficiency" (total jobs processed). In -fairness, for example, yields max-min fairness and efficiency maximization. Due to this ambiguity in defining "fairness," the fairness-efficiency tradeoff here can be viewed as an equitability-efficiency tradeoff.
B. Unique Challenges of Multiresource Fairness
The following new challenges on fairness arise due to the presence of multiple types of resources.
• In a single-resource scenario, a user's resource requirements can be represented with a scalar. With multiple resources, users have vectors of resource requirements, which may be distinct and must be scalarized before fairness can be evaluated. We visualize user heterogeneity in Section III-A and propose two scalarization methods in Section III-B, yielding parametrized families of multiresource fairness measures that satisfy the axioms of [4] .
• In a single-resource scenario, the most efficient allocation will clearly use the entire resource. In a multiresource scenario, however, users' heterogeneous resource requirements may not allow each resource to be completely used. Even how to measure efficiency is unclear: Should we use the total number of jobs allocated? 1 Or the amount of leftover resource capacity? Section V numerically examines both of these efficiency metrics, while Propositions 1 and 2 and their corollaries examine the impact of user heterogeneity on the number of jobs processed.
• The extension of max-min fairness to multiple resources is shown in [9] to satisfy several properties, such as Pareto efficiency. We characterize the parameterizations under which our multiresource fairness functions satisfy Pareto efficiency, sharing incentive, and envy-freeness (Propositions 3-5 and their corollaries).
• The existence of a fairness-efficiency tradeoff depends on both the scalarization of users' resource requirements and the subsequent evaluation of fairness. We show that a greater emphasis on the fairness component, or equitability, need not always decrease efficiency (Proposition 6) and give analytical conditions on when the fairness-efficiency tradeoff exists (Propositions 7 and 8 and their corollaries).
• When a fairness-efficiency tradeoff exists, the "best" operating point along this tradeoff depends on the operator's exogenously determined preferences. We characterize this psychological component to fairness by conducting a human subject experiment in which participants are asked to rank possible allocation choices in an online survey.
Our results indicate that people tend to cluster into two different groups: one preferring efficiency over fairness and one fairness over efficiency. After further discussion of related work in Section II, Section III develops our two new families of fairness functions, which we call Fairness on Dominant Shares (FDS) and Generalized Fairness on Jobs (GFJ). FDS includes the max-min fairness measure DRF proposed in [9] as a special case. We investigate key properties of these functions in Section IV and characterize conditions under which they are satisfied by FDS and GFJ. Section V then applies our fairness functions to numerical examples of data centers. We examine the relationship between the fairness-efficiency tradeoff and FDS and GFJ parameterizations. In Section VI, we characterize the parameter values consistent with people's fairness judgements, analyzing results from a survey asking participants to rank possible resource allocations for an example data center. All proofs can be found in [3, Appendix B].
II. RELATED WORK
Much of the existing theory on the fairness of resource allocations considers allocations of a single resource [4] , [10] - [12] (e.g., allocating available link bandwidth to network flows [13] - [16] ). The recent work [4] develops the following family of fairness functions for a single resource, unifying previously developed fairness measures. It was proven that this family, parametrized by two numbers, is the only family of functions satisfying four simple axioms of fairness metrics [5] (1) where and are parameters. 2 The parameter gives the "type" of fairness measured by (1) , and the parameter gives the emphasis on efficiency. A larger indicates greater emphasis on efficiency over fairness. If we take and , we recover -fairness for . Taking the limit as yields proportional fairness. Even multiresource allocation problems, such as scheduling jobs in a data center, are often treated as a single-resource problem (e.g., the Hadoop and Dryad schedulers [17] ). A recent paper [9] generalizes the max-min fairness measure to multiple-resource settings. Our work develops a unified analytical framework for fairness of multiresource allocations. In particular, in contrast to [9] , we incorporate the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in multiresource settings.
In the technical report [3, Appendix E], we provide a more comprehensive survey of other work on fairness. In addition 2 For and , (1) cannot be evaluated as written; instead, its value is the limit as , 0. For ease of notation, we assume this limiting behavior throughout the paper; [4] gives the limiting expressions. to further discussion on fairness in engineering frameworks, we summarize theories of fairness from computer science, economics, political philosophy, and sociology.
III. FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF MULTIRESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
We first present a visualization of heterogeneity among users' requirements for multiple resources in Section III-A. Section III-B then develops two new families of fairness functions, which scalarize these heterogeneous resource requirement vectors and use them to evaluate the fairness of multiresource allocations. These two families are FDS and GFJ. FDS measures the fairness of users' resource allocations by accounting for both the number of jobs allocated to each user (a function of the resources available) and the heterogeneity in different resource requirements across users. GFJ, on the other hand, assumes that users' utility depends solely on the number of jobs they are allocated, irrespective of their differing resource needs.
A. Visualizing User Heterogeneity
A major challenge of multiresource fairness is incorporating the heterogeneity of different users' requirements for different resources into the assessment of its fairness. Visualizing this heterogeneity can yield useful insights; in Section V, we examine in detail how heterogeneity affects the optimal allocation and achieved efficiency. The visualization has as many dimensions as there are different users. The axes correspond to the jobs allocated to each user, with feasible allocations shown as shaded regions bounded by linear resource constraints. The slopes of constraint line reflect the ratio of user 1's and user 2's requirements for resource . The heterogeneity of users' resource requirements can be captured in the variance of the . Homogeneity occurs when the variance is 0; in that case, the resource constraints have the same slope and reduce to one constraint. Heterogeneity increases with the variance of .
B. Defining Multiresource Fairness
We now formulate two fairness measures: 1) FDS, and 2) GFJ. We let denote the number of jobs allocated to each user . In the usual economic scenario, users receive utility from their allocated jobs, subject to a budget constraint on the amount they may pay for resources to process those jobs. In this work, we assume for simplicity that equals either the user's dominant share (for FDS) or number of jobs (for GFJ). 3 While users are heterogeneous in their resource requirements, the jobs for each user have the same resource requirements; should this not be the case, one may replace with , where and index jobs with distinct resource requirements. Since we do not consider the price structure and seller's revenue in this this model, we assume that users have infinite budgets and that the number of jobs is limited only by fixed maximum capacities of each resource available to the seller. Thus, instead of viewing "social welfare" in terms of buyer and seller utility functions, our fairness functions may be regarded as exogenously determined "social welfare" functions, allowing us to focus on the possible tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency that may arise even in this simplified scenario.
1) FDS:
As defined in [9] , a user's dominant share is the maximum share of any resource allocated to that user.
We let denote the maximum capacity of resource . We then have the resource constraints for all resources , where is the amount of resource which user requires for one job, and there are users. For ease of notation, we define as the share of resource required by user to process one job. We let (2) denote the maximum share of a resource required by user to process one job; then is user 's dominant share. We introduce the fairness measures (3) These fairness measures extend those developed in [4] for a single resource; details on their derivation are given in that work. Here, and are prespecified parameters. Note that is an important special case since, for , the fairness component of (3) reduces to for any allocation vector . Thus, (3) is simply a scalar multiple of the efficiency component if
. We make a standard assumption that all resources and all jobs are infinitely divisible, which is typical of many multiresource settings [19] , [20] . An illustrative example of FDS is given in Section III-B.3.
The fairness function (3) may be divided into two components, one representing fairness and one efficiency. The sum of the dominant shares raised to the power represents efficiency; thus, parametrizes efficiency's relative importance. The remainder of (3) is parametrized by and represents the fairness of the allocation. It is easily seen that for any value of , this component of (3) is maximized at an equal allocation. However, different values of will yield different orderings of unequal allocations. One allocation may be more fair than another when is used to parametrize fairness, but the second allocation may be more fair than the first when is used. In general, however, we can say that "larger is more fair." As , we obtain max-min fairness on the ratio of each user's dominant share to the sum of all the dominant shares.
As with , the fairness function approaches max-min fairness on the dominant shares. DRF, proposed in [9] , is thus a special case of FDS. Again letting denote the dominant share of user , DRF can be expressed as (4) Maximizing this equation subject to the constraints , , yields the DRF-optimal allocation. FDS is therefore a generalization of DRF, in which choosing the parameters and allows one to achieve different tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency.
FDS also includes the well-known -fairness family of functions as a special case. This fact easily follows from the relationship of the single-resource functions in [4] to -fairness, which is generally used to measure fairness in bandwidth allocation (see references in Section II). Taking and , the FDS function (3) becomes (5) Optimizing this function is equivalent to optimizing the -fairness function on dominant shares (6) 2) GFJ: Since some users require more resources per job than others, it might be more fair for those who require more resources to be allocated fewer jobs, thus increasing efficiency across all users. FDS captures this perspective. However, an individual user often cares only about the number of jobs processed (without accounting for heterogeneous resource requirements): Each user's notion of fairness may be based only on the number of jobs allocated. We therefore introduce another fairness measure called Generalized Fairness on Jobs, which uses the number of jobs allocated (instead of dominant shares) in the fairness function.
GFJ can be further motivated with bandwidth allocation examples. The utility function used in these scenarios is generally -fairness applied to the bandwidth allocated to each flow. These functions are therefore a special case of GFJ, a family of functions given by (7) Here, and are two parameters (just as in FDS), and is the number of jobs processed for user . As for FDS, we have the resource constraints for each resource . An illustrative example is given in Section III-B.3.
For and , GFJ reduces to -fairness on the number of jobs allocated to each user.
3) Differences Between FDS and GFJ:
We can summarize FDS' and GFJ's approaches as follows.
• FDS measures fairness in terms of the relative size of the dominant shares, explicitly accounting for heterogeneous resource requirements in both the objective function and the constraints. As a limiting case of FDS, DRF also follows this approach.
• On the other hand, GFJ measures fairness only in terms of the number of jobs allocated to each user; the heterogeneity in resource requirements only appears in the resource constraints. Users requiring more resources are thus treated equally, a result observed in Section V. When for all , FDS and GFJ are equivalent. Revisiting the example in the introduction, we have the resource constraints and . Thus, the dominant share of user 1 is since user 1 requires of the available CPUs and of the available memory for each job. Similarly, the dominant share of user 2 is since user 2 requires of the available memory and of the available CPUs for each job. FDS and GFJ can then be expressed as (8) where the fairness functions for FDS and GFJ are respectively Fig. 3 illustrates the approaches to multiresource fairness. We transpose the matrix to capture users' resource requirements; each row represents one user's requirements. One simplistic approach would assume perfectly substitutable resources; in that case, this matrix immediately collapses into a vector of users' single-resource requirements. However, this substitutability often does not hold. For example, CPUs and memory are not directly substitutable.
FDS and GFJ represent alternative approaches to the scalarization of each row in Fig. 3 's matrix. FDS and its limiting case DRF choose a dominant entry from the row vector of users' requirements. GFJ, on the other hand, scalarizes each row by the number of jobs processed with a bundle of different resources. These row-by-row scalarizations then yield another vector of users' scalars; evaluating fairness with or further reduces this vector to a final scalar quantifying fairness.
IV. PROPERTIES OF FDS AND GFJ
In this section, we prove key properties of the FDS and GFJ functions introduced above. We address the following questions.
• What happens to the optimal allocations when users have the same resource requirements? • What fairness properties do FDS and GFJ satisfy? For instance, are their optimal allocations Pareto-efficient? Sharing incentive compatible? Envy-free? • Does there always exist a fairness-efficiency tradeoff? Section IV-A characterizes the optimal fairness values in certain special cases, while Section IV-B examines the conditions of and under which FDS and GFJ satisfy important properties relevant to fairness quantification and fairness-efficiency tradeoffs. Finally, Section IV-C examines the conditions under which a fairness-efficiency tradeoff exists.
We consider users and different resources. In the special cases or , user heterogeneity may be easily visualized as in Fig. 2 in Section III-A. We use the term user-resource system to refer to a given set of users and resources with associated resource requirements and capacities.
A. Values of FDS and GFJ
Heterogeneity is measured by the variance in the slopes of Fig. 2 . When all users have the same ratios of multiresource requirements (i.e., the variance of the is zero), the problem reduces to that of a single resource.
Proposition 1 (Reduction to Single-Resource Case):
Suppose that the resource constraints may be written as (9) . Let . Then, the problem reduces to single-resource fairness on resource , where . Moreover, FDS and DRF both yield the allocation . GFJ yields the allocation .
Definition 1 (Efficiency):
Let denote the allocation efficiency.
In this special case, we also have the following corollary. Corollary 1: For allocations that maximize DRF and FDS and the efficiency of these allocations increases the fastest if is decreased. For allocations that maximize GFJ In other words, the system's efficiency will increase if the user with the lowest decreases her resource requirements. Intuitively, decreasing a smaller by some absolute amount allows a proportionally larger amount of jobs to be processed-for instance, decreasing from 4 to 2 allows twice as many jobs to be processed, as equals user 's share of the resource. If, however, , e.g., , then decreasing by 2 allows only 50% more jobs to be processed.
We now consider heterogeneous users and assume that their resource requirements are uniformly distributed in , a given positive constant. Then, as the number of users goes to infinity, the optimal FDS and GFJ values converge as follows.
Proposition 2 (Optimal FDS and GFJ Values):
The optimal FDS value converges in probability as (10) Thus, users' asymptotic dominant share is . In contrast, the optimal GFJ value converges in probability as (11) Users are asymptotically allocated resources for jobs. We note that appears in (11) but not (10) since the dominant shares, not the number of jobs, appear in the FDS objective function. Scaling the resource requirements by is equivalent to scaling the optimal allocations by in the resource constraints; these cancel in calculating the dominant shares . We thus see that in the limit of a large number of heterogeneous users, with and , the optimal FDS value increases while the optimal GFJ value decreases as more resources are added to the system. This proposition highlights the fundamental difference between FDS and GFJ: In the limit, they yield very different allocations.
B. Three Key Properties of Fairness
We next turn our attention to fairness and its relationship with efficiency, using three widely used properties of fairness functions (see e.g., [9] and the many references therein):
Definition 2: A function is Pareto-efficient if, whenever Pareto-dominates (i.e., for each index and for some ), . Definition 3: Sharing incentive is the property that no user's dominant share is less than . Thus, each user under a sharing incentive compatible allocation would process more jobs than if the resources were split equally among users.
Definition 4: Envy-freeness holds if and only if no user envies another user's allocation. Mathematically, let denote the amount of resource allocated to user . User can then process jobs. Envy-freeness is defined as the property that for any . In words, no other user's allocation would enable a user to process more jobs than her allocation would.
We investigate if and when these properties are satisfied by FDS and GFJ. Our results show that the answer depends on several factors, e.g., the values of the parameters and . Table I summarizes our findings.
TABLE I CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH PROPERTIES DO NOT HOLD FOR ALL USER-RESOURCE SYSTEMS
We first consider Pareto efficiency. Evidently, this property holds for large . Based on [4] , we can in fact specify a threshold for above which Pareto efficiency holds.
Proposition 3 (Pareto Efficiency of FDS and GFJ):
The fairness functions (3) and (7) are Pareto-efficient when if and only if . The absolute value signs are necessary, as for , (3) and (7) are negative. For this range of , a more negative therefore emphasizes efficiency. If efficiency is sufficiently emphasized (i.e., is sufficiently large), Pareto efficiency holds; it is thus a weakened notion of efficiency. We next consider sharing incentive.
Proposition 4 (Sharing Incentive of FDS):
Suppose . Then, we can prove the following.
(a) Sharing incentive is satisfied by the FDS-optimal allocation when and . (b) For and , there exists a user-resource system such that the FDS-optimal allocation for this system does not satisfy the sharing incentive property. (c) For any , and sufficiently large, there exists a user-resource system for which the FDS-optimal allocation does not satisfy the sharing incentive property. , the FDS function becomes equivalent to the isoelastic -fair utility in economics; corresponds to a measure of constant relative risk-aversion for individual users. 4 As increases, individual risk-averse users find the resource allocation more equitable and become collectively envy-free. The following corollary establishes that this interesting envy-free behavior emerges (for FDS) at a threshold of .
Corollary 3 (Envy-Freeness of FDS):
For and , the envy-freeness property holds if ; if , then envy-freeness holds for all user-resource systems and any . Moreover, there exists a user-resource system whose FDSoptimal allocation does not satisfy envy-freeness under the same conditions (b) and (c) in Proposition 4 for which the sharing incentive property does not always hold. 5 In contrast to FDS, GFJ need not always satisfy sharing incentive even for . there exists a user-resource system whose GFJ-optimal allocation does not satisfy the sharing incentive property: (a) ; (b) and ; (c) and ; (d) sufficiently large; (e) . Similarly, GFJ-optimal allocations need not be envy-free.
Corollary 4 (Envy-Freeness of GFJ):
Under the conditions of Proposition 5, there exists a user-resource system such that envy-freeness does not hold for the GFJ-optimal allocation. Fig. 4 illustrates Propositions 4's and 5's results on the sharing incentive property, as well as Corollaries 3's and 4's results on envy-freeness. We note that FDS can be shown to satisfy both sharing incentive and envy-freeness for a wider range of parameter values than GFJ. Since sharing incentive and envy-freeness both explicitly take resource requirements into account in their definitions, they will more likely be satisfied by a fairness function that does the same.
C. Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoff
We now consider two ways in which a fairness-efficiency tradeoff may not exist. First, an increased emphasis on fairness need not decrease efficiency. Second, the efficiency-maximizing allocation may also be the "most fair."
Traditionally, a larger parameter in -fairness functions is thought to be "more fair" [21] , [22] ; this statement is made mathematically precise in [4] . In [13] , however, it is shown that when a network allocates bandwidth so as to maximize -fairness, total throughput in the network may increase with . It may even decrease as capacity increases. These "counterintuitive" results hold in the general multiresource problem.
Consider a family of utility functions ; here, is a parameter indexing the family of utility functions, and the specific functional form of is not specified. For instance, we could use the -fairness functions in (3), with and . We incorporate the resource capacity constraints in the matrix inequality and assume that is a matrix of full row rank consisting only of those constraints that are tight at the optimal allocation for the given value of .
We let be an dimensional matrix whose columns form a basis for the nullspace of , and again let denote the total efficiency. The negative of the utility function's Hessian matrix is denoted by , and we define , , , and , where the are the columns of the matrix . Let denote the matrix with the th row replaced by . We use to denote a direction of perturbation of the capacity vector and to denote the derivative of in the direction of . From [13] , we have (12) (13) We can further prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Efficiency Nonmonotonicity): Efficiency increases with if and only if (14) Moreover, efficiency may decrease with an increase in the capacity vector . If capacity increases proportionally, i.e., for some small , then . In the special case of only one tight capacity constraint (e.g., one resource), efficiency always increases with capacity. The technical report [3, Appendix C] contains a numerical example in which efficiency increases with .
We next examine the conditions under which an equal allocation (equal dominant shares for FDS or equal numbers of jobs for GFJ) maximizes efficiency. In these situations, there is no fairness-efficiency tradeoff; the most fair allocation maximizes the total number of jobs processed. As this property is an ideal case, it will likely be satisfied only under stringent conditions. Indeed, our results show that it holds only if users' requirements for each resource are sufficiently similar. We again express the resource constraints in matrix form as , and simplify them to , where is a vector of 1's and .
Proposition 7 (Maximizing Fairness and Efficiency I):
Suppose there are tight constraints at the maximum-efficiency allocation. This allocation equalizes the dominant shares (FDS has no fairness-efficiency tradeoff) if and only if (15) for some constant and all resources . Users receive the same numbers of jobs (GFJ has no fairness-efficiency tradeoff) if (16) for some constant and all resources . Fig. 5 illustrates these conditions. Our conclusions are more subtle when constraints are tight at an efficiency-maximizing allocation.
Proposition 8 (Maximizing Fairness and Efficiency II):
Suppose that constraints are tight at an efficiency-maximizing allocation . If this allocation is the unique allocation maximizing efficiency, then at least one of the and one user is allocated no jobs. If other allocations also maximize efficiency, an allocation equalizing either the dominant shares or number of jobs processed maximizes efficiency if and only if at the equal allocation, the constraint set intersects the hyperplane on a set of dimension at least 1. Fig. 6 shows a two-dimensional illustration of Proposition 8. The left graph shows a unique efficiency-maximizing allocation when exactly one resource constraint is tight, and the right graph shows a set of multiple efficiency-maximizing allocations.
We can use this proposition to derive a sufficient condition for the efficiency-maximizing allocation to equalize the dominant shares or number of jobs for each user.
Corollary 5: Suppose resource constraints hold at the efficiency-maximizing allocation. Then, if for some users and and all resources , (user is allocated no jobs) at any efficiency-maximizing allocation.
If (the single-resource case), we can derive conditions under which FDS and GFJ are equivalent.
Corollary 6: The maximum efficiency allocation equalizes the dominant shares (FDS) or jobs per user (GFJ) if and only if users . In other words, each user needs the same amount of the single resource to process one job.
V. APPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
We consider an illustrative example of a data center with CPU and RAM constraints. There are two users, each of whom requires a fixed amount of each resource to accomplish a job. Jobs are assumed to be infinitely divisible [19] , [20] . In order to benchmark performance, we use the same parameters as [9] : User 1 requires one CPU and 4 GB of RAM for each job, and user 2 requires three CPUs and 1 GB of RAM for each job. There are nine CPUs and 18 GB of RAM at first. We then vary these constraint values to observe their impact on fairness.
Suppose that the fairness function is given by , e.g., FDS (3), DRF (4), GFJ (7). Then, the allocation problem is
where and are the number of jobs allocated to users 1 and 2, respectively. We use DRF as the benchmark fairness to compare the performance of our FDS and GFJ functions. We define percent fairness as the percentage difference between the optimal DRF fairness value (i.e., the minimum dominant share) and the DRF fairness value of the allocation obtained from FDS or GFJ. The percent efficiency is defined as the percentage difference between the total number of jobs processed in the given allocation and the maximum number of jobs that can be processed, given the same capacity constraints. We also introduce another efficiency measure, the leftover capacity (i.e., the amount of unused resources).
We investigate the outcomes of the proposed fairness measures along two dimensions:
• comparing the achieved efficiency when user heterogeneity and resource capacity are varied; • examining the range of attainable fairness-efficiency tradeoffs for different values of the parameters and . While we focus on the example above in this section, similar numerical studies can be performed for other scenarios. The technical report [3, Appendix C] considers one such example of bandwidth allocation in a linear network.
A. Efficiency
We first use our two efficiency measures-leftover capacity and percent efficiency-to investigate user heterogeneity's effect on achieved efficiency. Heterogeneity is measured by the variance in the slopes of users' resource requirements, as defined in Fig. 2 of Section III-A. Two users with identical resource requests become homogeneous, with zero variance. At the other extreme, the users do not share any resource requirements and become decoupled, with infinite variance.
We calculate the optimal FDS, GFJ, and DRF allocations for , . First, Fig. 7 examines the leftover capacity as a function of the variance in . The heterogeneity was varied by changing the RAM requirement of user 2 from 1 to 13 GB. Thus, the RAM constraint line in Fig. 2 's representation tilts from very steep to very flat. This tilting geometrically explains the overall "V" trend in the figure. When the RAM requirement is below 3 GB (a steep constraint line), the variance of is over 0.5: Only RAM is leftover. When the RAM requirement is above 3 GB (a flatter line), the variance of is less than 0.5: Only CPUs are leftover. The change in the leftover resource is due to the changing shape of the feasible region.
In this example, we see that for low heterogeneity in users' resource requirements, FDS, GFJ, and DRF have similar efficiency values. In fact, Proposition 1 states that at zero heterogeneity, DRF and FDS are optimized at the same allocation, predicting part of the observed behavior. As the heterogeneity increases, DRF has a lot of leftover capacity compared to GFJ and FDS, especially for a variance larger than 1 in Fig. 7 . DRF trades off efficiency significantly to preserve users' minimum dominant share with increasingly heterogeneous resource requirements. Even GFJ performs worse than FDS, which yields the lowest leftover capacity. As FDS includes resource requirements in its fairness function, we intuitively expect such a result.
We next examine the percent efficiency in jobs processed as a function of the variance in in Fig. 8 . As in Fig. 7 , for low heterogeneity across users' resource requirements, FDS, GFJ, and DRF perform at similar efficiency levels. All three achieve full efficiency for a variance near 0.5. Again, the efficiency attained is also much higher (about 15%) for FDS and GFJ than for DRF as the variance increases.
In summary, enforcing DRF can significantly reduce efficiency as measured by either leftover capacity or percent efficiency. This is also the case when the number of users grows; Fig. 9 shows the leftover capacity versus the number of users in the system. Only RAM capacity was leftover; in all scenarios, all of the CPUs were used. For a large number of users, we see that FDS and GFJ both use more capacity than DRF. Users' CPU requirements were fixed at two CPUs; their RAM requirements were drawn from a uniform distribution. Other randomly chosen RAM requirements yield similar plots. Finally, we examine the impact of changing RAM capacity on the attainable efficiency levels. Fig. 10 shows how varying this capacity affects the efficiency attained at the optimal allocation. We see that when the dominant shares for both users are equal, at 12 GB of RAM capacity, GFJ and FDS have the same range of achievable efficiency. Moreover, and can be chosen to achieve higher efficiency in FDS and GFJ. The DRF function serves as a lower bound to the efficiency values attainable with the FDS functions. Fig. 11 . Larger values lead to more equitable allocations: Optimal allocations for various fairness measures in a data center example, using fairness for FDS and GFJ.
The impact of capacity expansion also highlights an interesting dimension of the economy of scale in large networks. The standard view is that a large scale helps smooth out temporal fluctuations of demands through statistical multiplexing, e.g., at any aggregation point in a broadband access network. In addition to temporal "heterogeneity" (bursting at different times), network users may have resource type heterogeneity: Some applications need more CPU processing, while others need more storage or bandwidth. Can this heterogeneity be exploited to utilize different types of resources more efficiently? The answer depends on how these different resources are allocated among the users. If DRF is used, for example, efficiency can be quite low. However, by using the appropriate FDS parametrization, resource request heterogeneity can indeed be leveraged along with increases in resource capacity and turned into another type of economy of scale.
B. Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs
Section V-A established that when users are very heterogeneous, FDS and GFJ outperform DRF, achieving a much greater efficiency. However, we expect that this larger efficiency comes at a cost of decreased fairness or equitability. This section examines the general behavior of fairness when a larger efficiency is achieved. Here, we measure fairness as percent fairness with the DRF metric and efficiency as percent efficiency on the number of jobs processed. Fig. 11 shows the optimal allocations of jobs for different values of , . Both FDS and GFJ become -fair on the dominant shares of and jobs allocated to each user, respectively, for . As increases, decreases, so that fairness is emphasized more than efficiency and FDS asymptotes to DRF. For small (i.e., more relative emphasis on efficiency than fairness), the optimal FDS allocation maximizes efficiency. In the case of GFJ, which emphasizes the fairness on jobs allocated, larger values produce a more fair allocation of jobs across users than FDS, as expected. Consequently, the total number of jobs processed (i.e., efficiency) is lower for GFJ than for FDS. Fig. 12 gives a representative plot of how this tradeoff varies with and . As grows larger, the percent efficiency from the FDS measure drops, approaching DRF in the limit . The GFJ fairness increases until , at which point the GFJ-optimal allocation is also DRF-optimal. (We see in Fig. 11 that the GFJ allocation "crosses" the DRF allocation line at this Fig. 12 . Fairness-efficiency tradeoff can be tuned by changing : Percentage of fairness and efficiency achieved for various fairness measures in a data center example, using fairness for FDS and GFJ. Notice that an increased emphasis on fairness (i.e., larger ) need not always decrease the efficiency of the allocation, as seen for for the GFJ measure. value of .) For larger values of , GFJ quickly converges to an allocation with a more equal number of jobs per user; thus, its efficiency decreases. However, efficiency in FDS decreases more slowly since FDS attempts to make the dominant shares, not the number of jobs, more equitable.
Finally, we show the interaction between capacity constraints and the range of fairness-efficiency tradeoffs achieved. The shaded region in Fig. 13 shows the attained tradeoffs for a large range of and values; each point corresponds to some and values in the FDS function that achieve the shown operating tradeoff. This achieved tradeoff depends on the available capacity, with contour lines for various RAM capacities shown in the figure. As RAM capacity increases from 4 to GB, the tradeoff stops: One can increase both fairness and efficiency. At a RAM capacity of GB, the conditions of Proposition 7 are satisfied, and efficiency is maximized when the dominant shares are equal. When the RAM capacity goes above up to 25 GB, user 1's dominant share decreases. Thus, an increase in fairness requires an increase in and user 1's CPU allocation. User 2 is then allocated fewer jobs, decreasing efficiency. In this figure, one can achieve 100% efficiency and fairness when RAM capacity is GB, but such an ideal operating point does not always exist. Fig. 14 shows the analog of Fig. 13 for GFJ functions. In this case, the range of attainable efficiency at the maximum allocation decreases as the fairness value increases. Thus, one can increase both fairness and efficiency as RAM capacity goes from 4 to 25 GB. Moreover, the contour lines "bend back" on themselves, indicating that for different and parameters, the same fairness value can result in many efficiency values at the optimal allocation. When RAM capacity equals 11.25 GB, the conditions of Proposition 7 are satisfied, and there is no tradeoff between fairness and efficiency.
VI. SURVEY ON FAIRNESS PARAMETERS
In this section, we provide results from a simple survey to complement the proposed theoretical framework with a demonstration of how the typical values of fairness function parameters can be estimated from large-scale consumer surveys. We note that our survey methodology and results should be considered as a demonstration of one out of many feasible approaches rather than a prescription of what exact parameter values to choose in a given real world scenario. In particular, this survey provides a systematic way of inferring an initial estimate for values, visualizes participant clusters in the fairness-efficiency space, and connects the FDS and GFJ functions with participants' responses. The technical report [3, Section VI] contains more details of our findings.
A. Survey Methodology
We conducted an online survey in January-February 2012, which received 143 responses, mostly from the US. Out of these responses, 110 were complete and were used in the subsequent analysis. The participants were given six questions, each with a simplified "toy" scenario of resource allocation in a data center, where jobs from two different clients had heterogeneous resource requirements over multiple resources (CPU and storage). Our online survey participants were faculty, students, and staff primarily from the Electrical Engineering (EE) and Computer Science (CS) departments of Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and George Washington University, Washington, DC. They all were familiar with everyday computer use, and hence intuitively understood the two resources considered (processing power and storage capacity). The survey questionnaire further explained the context to ensure participants' understanding. We limited our question scenarios to only two types of resources in order to ease participants' understanding of the questions, although more sophisticated methods using conjoint analysis can be used on data with more resources [23] . In the last question, we increase the number of resources to three: clients' jobs required CPU, storage, and bandwidth. Each of the six questions offered five different options of distributing resources among the two clients, with each option resulting in a particular outcome. For each question, the survey participants were asked to rank the five allocation options in decreasing order of preference, as shown in Fig. 15 .
In four of the questions, the five options that the survey participants were asked to rank were reported in terms of the number of jobs completed for each data center client under that option's resource allocation. In the other questions, the options were reported in terms of the leftover (unused or wasted) capacity resulting from that allocation option. The questions had either the same set of allocation choices or a scalar multiple, thus permitting us to compare participants' choices when the outcomes were reported in different metrics ("total number of jobs completed" and "leftover resources") or were scaled by a constant factor. To avoid influencing the participant's decisions, we did not explicitly inform them of the survey's purpose, i.e., evaluating their fairness preferences.
The full survey is available in [3, Appendix D] . In Section VI-B, we present our analysis of the survey responses.
B. Results
Our analysis of the survey results focuses on three goals:
• evaluate consistency of the results across users with the fairness axioms in [3] , [4] ; • cluster participants based on the fairness and efficiency values inferred from their preferences in their rankings of resource allocations; • determine the different and heat maps of compatible parameter values for participants in each cluster. We address these sequentially as follows. 
1) Axiom Validation:
We first use the survey results to examine our construction of the fairness functions, evaluating the consistency of the results with three of the four axioms from which these functions are constructed (see [3, Appendix A] for a full list of the axioms). To keep the survey simple, we were unable to evaluate the Axiom of Continuity, which, however, is quite intuitive.
On examining the number of participants ranking each allocation first, second, third, etc., in each question of the survey, we see that a clear consensus emerges across the participant pool. For instance, for question 2 (Fig. 15) most people rank the allocations from best to worst as 3, 5, 1, 2, 4. It is interesting to note that the fourth allocation, under which client had no jobs, has the lowest rank. In fact, allocation 2, which is less efficient than allocation 4, was more preferred. This result is thus consistent with the Axiom of Starvation: Participants generally dislike starvation allocations, even if they are more efficient.
We implicitly evaluate the remaining two axioms (those of Saturation and Partition) by examining the consistency of participants' responses when the allocations are scaled up or down. Our fairness functions predict that a person's rankings of different allocations should not change with this scaling. In fact, for each question, a clear consensus ranking emerges; the technical report [3, Fig. 16 ] gives a visual representation of this fact. Moreover, this ordering of allocations is consistent across all questions. 6 This observation is especially significant since questions 3 and 5 report the leftover capacity as a metric instead of the total number of jobs processed-thus, even when the efficiency metric changes, participants' answers are consistent across the different survey questions.
2) Participant Clustering: We now evaluate the consistency of different people's responses by calculating the average preferred fairness and efficiency values for each person and each question. These are calculated by taking a weighted average of the efficiency and fairness values for each allocation; the weights are determined by the participant's ranking of that allocation. The fairness metric is defined to be the negative of the difference between the numbers of jobs processed for clients and , while the efficiency metric is taken from the survey as the total number of jobs processed (or the leftover capacity). The leftover capacity is measured by the negative of the percentage of leftover capacity for each resource, to facilitate comparison of leftover CPUs with leftover gigabytes. We use negatives for the fairness value and leftover capacity metric so that an increase in the fairness or leftover capacity metric indicates a more fair or more efficient allocation.
We see from Fig. 16 that for question 1, participants tend to fall into two distinct clusters; one cluster puts more emphasis on efficiency, and one more emphasis on fairness. The two clusters have approximately equal numbers of participants (e.g., 52 in each for question 1). Moreover, these clusters are consistent across questions; these results are not shown here for reasons of space, but may be found in [3, Section VI-B]. While the numerical fairness and efficiency values vary depending on the allocation scalarization and efficiency metric in each question, both clusters lie in approximately the same position in the graph for each question.
3) Parameter Choices: We next determine and values compatible with the answers in different clusters (cf. Fig. 16's  clusters) . The results for participants in both clusters were the same for all questions; thus, we only show the and values for question 2 (the clustering pattern in Fig. 16 is similar to that of question 2).
We use exhaustive search for discretized and values to determine whether a given allocation ranking agrees with that obtained using the fairness function. Fig. 17 shows the heat map of compatible and values for the two dominant clusters, assuming that participants use a GFJ fairness function; the color intensity signifies the number of times an answer is compatible with the given value. A darker color indicates a larger number of compatible answers across users. Though no single value is compatible with all answers, a majority of responses were compatible with some value: 50% of cluster 1 and 60% of cluster 2 participants agreed on at least one pair. 7 As expected, the compatible values for cluster 1 [ Fig. 17(a) ] are higher in absolute value than those in cluster 2 [ Fig. 17(b) ], as is consistent with cluster-2 participants' preferring fairness over efficiency (Fig. 16) . The reference lines in the figure show the Pareto-efficient frontier. For cluster 2, most of the compatible values with are below this frontier, i.e., not Pareto-efficient. This does not happen for cluster-1 participants, as might be expected since they emphasize efficiency. However, as increases, more Pareto-efficient values are compatible with at least some answers. Fig. 18 shows the heat graphs for both participant clusters when FDS fairness is used. Only the heat graphs for question 2 are shown; the other questions give similar results. We see that all of the values tested in Fig. 18 (a) are compatible with the cluster-1 responses (50% of responses agree on these values). We may partially explain these results by the fact that cluster-1 participants all favor allocation 3 over allocation 5: Calculating the dominant shares of each client, we see that allocation 5 actually gives clients less equitable dominant shares, and that the sum of dominant shares for allocation 3 is also larger than that for allocation 5. Thus, no matter which and are considered, allocation 3 will be ranked above allocation 5. All pairs are therefore consistent with this ranking. Most participants rank the other allocations in a manner consistent with ranking 3 above 5; those participants whose additional rankings are inconsistent do not show any compatible values. In contrast to cluster 1, none of the values tested are inconsistent with cluster 2's allocation preferences. We can account for this result by noting that all cluster-2 participants prefer allocation 5 (processing an equal number of jobs for each client) over allocation 3. However, allocation 3 is both more fair and more efficient (under FDS) than allocation 5, and hence is inconsistent with cluster 2's answers if they used FDS. We thus conjecture that inconsistency arises because GFJ is a "more natural" fairness function: For certain and values, most of cluster-1 and cluster-2 participants exhibit preferences consistent with GFJ fairness. While it is intuitive that most people find it natural to understand fairness in terms of jobs completed rather than dominant share, not least because the latter is harder to calculate and less widely used, this is an interesting direction to explore through repeated and controlled behavioral experiments.
The fact that participants generally seem to follow GFJ rather than FDS fairness has interesting implications, as Propostions 4 and 5 show that sharing incentive and envy-freeness are more likely to hold when FDS is used instead of GFJ. Participants thus pay more attention to the number of jobs allocated to each client, rather than each client's share of the resources allocated; more generally, we can say that in making allocation decisions, many participants did not fully internalize the heterogeneity in the clients' different resource requirements. Intuitively, this might be expected since the number of jobs allocated is a more "natural" measure of fairness than the proportion of different resources allocated. However, this observation, if validated in a larger survey, can provide useful guidelines for data center operators in terms of educating their clients about the externality imposed on others by each client's unique heterogeneous resource requirements.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Initial exploration suggests that both FDS and GFJ can be unified into a single framework. The idea is to use a -norm function to scalarize the resource requirement vector of user , and then evaluate the resulting fairness by . This method leads to a new family of fairness measures, parameterized , , and , i.e., (18) Fairness includes many fairness measures as special cases. For instance, and , while gives the total resource usage in the system. This function again satisfies the four axioms of [4] , as do FDS and GFJ. Moreover, Pareto efficiency is satisfied for , . We expect that, in analogy with Propositions 4 and 5 and their corollaries, threshold values of and can be found, above which sharing incentive and envy-freeness are satisfied if and . In addition to the functional unification proposed in (18) , one may extend this work to incorporate an economic perspective. In such problems, the resource owner sells resources to the individual users, who decide how much to buy based on their utility received, a function of their allocated resources. The "socially optimal" resource allocation maximizes the sum of user and seller utilities. In this work, we assume that users' utility equals either the dominant share or number of jobs processed and use fairness as the social welfare function, without incorporating pricing. However, one could incorporate both pricing and utility functions into our framework [24] .
In the particular case of data centers, a number of extensions to the current framework are possible. While we have assumed that both resources and jobs are infinitely divisible, in practice a job may require a minimum, indivisible bundle of resources, e.g., 2 GB of memory and one CPU, to run one instance of the job. Allocating less than this minimum requirement offers no more benefits than allocating nothing at all. Second, our fairness measures are assumed to be irrelevant to the feasible region of resources. Adding a feasible region and indivisible resources would lead to a fairness version of the knapsack problem, which has no known solution. Some approaches to the knapsack problem are summarized in [3, Appendix E] .
Another interesting direction to explore is to extend our multiresource fairness theory to account for job deadlines, scheduling, and user utility from allocated resources. Finally, our fairness analysis is based on a model of static jobs whose resource demands follow a constant pattern. Many applications not only have time elasticity of demand, but also allow jobs to dynamically change the composition of a bundle of different types of resources. These are all challenging problems that can be explored as future work.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we introduce FDS and GFJ, two families of fairness functions for multiresource allocations. FDS also includes as a special case the recently proposed generalization of the max-min fairness measure for multiple resources. Different parameterizations of these functions generate a range of fairness-efficiency tradeoffs, thus allowing for different degrees of emphasis on fairness and efficiency that suit different network operation needs.
We consider three key properties of fairness functions: Pareto efficiency, sharing incentive, and envy-freeness. FDS and GFJ are both Pareto-efficient if , . FDS satisfies the sharing incentive property and is envy-free for and ; if and , then sharing incentive and envy-freeness are only sometimes satisfied. GFJ may or may not be sharing-incentive compatible or envy-free for any , . We also explore the estimation of the and values that correspond to people's preferences. Preliminary results along these lines are given in Section VI, though one can easily imagine extending both the results analysis and the questions asked to participants. Given the limited set of allocations ranked by the participants, reverse-engineering unique values compatible with each response was not feasible, but it would be interesting to determine if such unique parameters exist given the rankings of more allocations. Moreover, our current sample size consists primarily of students and others in the academic community who are familiar with computers; with a wider range of participants, we could examine the impact of various demographic factors on participants' responses. In particular, we could investigate whether participants naturally group themselves into more than two clusters, and whether these have any demographic correlations.
